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Examination of the respondents' brief discloses 
that the sole basis relied upon for affirming the rul-
1ng below lies in the language of No. 5 under para-
Piaph three of the building loan agreement, viz.: 
~ 
_5. $4,000. After house is completed a(' 
~ordmg to, plans. and specifications now on filr 
m Lender s Off ice, ya rel has been graded ani' 
all bills for mate1·ials and lab01· have been pair/ 
The respondents' argument is essentially that 
the language of this clause binds the appellant a,; 
well as the respondents. In determining the validitv 
of this position, it would be well to review again th;. 
meaning and purport of this clause, considered both 
in light of its relationship to other provisions and 
in the context of the loan agreement as a whole. 
POINT I 
THE SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS INCLUD· 
ING THE PROVISION FOR FINAL PAYMENT 
CONTAINED IN THE LOAN AGREEMENT 
SERVED ONLY TO DEFINE THE RIGHTS OF 
LENDER AND BORROWER WITH RESPECT 
TO THE DUTY TO ADV ANGE FUNDS ACCORD· 
ING TO THE PROGRESS OF CONSTRUCTIOI\ 
IT DID NOT PURPORT TO ESTABLISH THI 
RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES UPON DISBURSL 
MENT OF THE MORTGAGE FUNDS. 
In appellant's initial brief, it was shown tki. 
the manner of disbursing funds provided for in tL, 
loan agreement was the method usually employed;: 
construction lending. This method clearly contr111· 
plates that the borrower shall be entitled to ha1" 
the funds disbursed when the events specified in th< 
agreement are met. In essence, then, the pro\'isi 1 m~ 
for disbursement contained in paragraph three estah· 
lished the obligation of the lender to nd1 1m1a th· 
mortgage funds. 
3 
\\'holly apart from this aspect of the agreement 
·111' othi>r prm·isions which govern the rights of the 
part iPs upon clisbursemen t of the funds. Thus, in 
1rnragraph two it is provided, inter alia, that the 
h,nTO\\·ers ~ue to remit to the lender such other 
:llllounts as may be required from time to time "to 
assure full payment for (the) improvements." This 
language obviously contemplates a situation where 
adual job cost might exceed the contract price, and 
rrquires the borrower to make good the excess, not-
withstanding any previous disbursement of funds. 
Also in paragraph three - the language on 
which respondents predicate their entire case - it 
!s provided that lender may disburse funds to any 
" ... contractor" without liability for so doing. And 
in the rider attached to the agreement, it is expressly 
provided: "Lender in its sole discretion may from 
time to time make any or all such disbursements 
without the occurrence of any or all conditions there-
to .... " 
POINT II 
VIE\VING THE LOAN AGREEMENT AS A 
\\'JIOLE, IT IS CLEAR THAT PARAGRAPH 
THHEE \VAS NOT INTENDED TO DICTATE 
THE EXCLUSIVE MANNER OF DISBURSE-
~IENT BY THE APPELLANT; BUT RATHER 
THAT APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WITH REGARD 
TO DISBURSEMENT WERE GOVERNED BY 
IJTHER PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT 
FULLY SUPPORTING THE ACTUAL PAY-
\IF\T OF FUNDS MADE BY APPELLANT. 
4 
It is apparent that respondents' position can~ 
upheld only if the above mentioned parts - and in. 
deed very material parts - of the loan agreement 
are ignored. For, in substance, the respondents' con. 
tention is simply that the obligation of the appellant 
to disburse, as contained in paragraph three, must 
dictate its own mode of disbursement should it choose 
to pay funds directly to parties designated in the 
agreement.* Under respondents' interpretation, 
therefore, the provisions noted above which directly 
control disbursement procedure are mere surplus-
age, since they are so patently at variance with the 
position contended for by respondents. 
However, it is clear the courts do not interpret 
contracts by ignoring material clauses and provi-
sions, but will, rather, consider all parts of the in-
strument in their endeavor to apply a reasonable 
construction thereto. (Cornwall v. Willow Creek 
Country Club, 13 U. 2d 160.) 369 P 2<l 928, As stated 
in Gates v. Daines, 3 U. 2d 95, 279 P 2d 458. 
The court may construe the contract oniY 
as to give effect to the entire agreement with· 
out ignoring any part thereof. 
*We point out the fact that respondents are able to cite only o~e 
case in support of their contention, viz., Holand v. Brown, 15 U. 2d 
422. This decision adds nothing insofar as the instant controvers), 
is concerned, for it s~mply states that inse;ted material will preha1; 
over the printed port10ns of a contract. This, of course assumes .t 3· 
some inconsistency or contradiction exists between the w.y.1~ter 
and printed portio~s ?f the contract. Corbin, Contracts § 548. e~ 
is no such contradiction here; paragra\lh. thre~ and subpara~r~;t~ 
the;euf!-der rel~te only to t~e events ~vmg rise ~o the appe ·~~ 1 ; 
obhgation to disburse; the rights relating to .the. disbursement 1f;
11
,, 
are covered elsewhere in the agreement, as 1s d1s<'ussed more 
in the body of the present brief. 
5 
It is true also that 
. . . construction (is) pref erred which 
will harmonize all provisions of the writ-
ings .... 
Here, it is apparent the conditions contained 
in paragraph three were intended only to define the 
erents which had to occur before the appellant was 
obligated to disburse funds; the appellant then had 
the option of paying the borrowers directly or of 
disbursing the funds directly to any one or all of 
the parties specified, including the general contrac-
tor. In the event the latter method were adopted, the 
parties expressly agreed the appellant should have 
the right to pay the funds as it might in its discre-
tion deem proper, such right clearly not subject to 
but in fact wholly exclusive of the conditions qualify-
ing its obligation to disburse in the first instance. 
CONCLUSION 
The end result is that the appellant did dis-
burse the funds in accordance with terms of the loan 
agreement, and no evidence whatever has been ad-
duced to show that such funds were not actually used 
for construction purposes. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & 
CLARK 
1111 Deseret Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
